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Abstract
Compares the application of EEC competition laws and U.S. antitrust laws to exclusive dis-
tribution agreements, and noting an interesting development in the two systems. Article analyzes
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. and concludes it introduced the rule of reason to the
U.S. approach for analyzing all nonprice vertical restrictions, but did not provide concrete guide-
lines for its application. The EEC approach, on the other hand, is designed to promote the goal of
Common Market integration by preventing the insulation of national markets. Thus the Commis-
sion and the Court of Justice have developed a favorable attitude towards territorial and exclusive
supply restrictions, but are stricter with regard to price and customer restrictions.
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INTRODUCTION
The application of anticartel provisions to distribution
agreements constitutes a problem of acute interest for lawyers
and businessmen on both sides of the Atlantic. In the United
States, the Supreme Court's decision in Continental T. V, Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc.' has put an end to the "Schwinn doctrine, "2
which was in force until 1977. According to this doctrine, most
of the vertical restraints imposed on dealers (particularly terri-
torial, customer, and price restrictions), were considered to be
per se illegal under the antitrust laws.3 Sylvania has established
a flexible rule of reason approach for all nonprice vertical re-
strictions but has not provided concrete guidelines for the ap-
plication of the new doctrine.4 It has given rise to a broad and
still ongoing discussion on the economic advantages and dis-
advantages of vertical restraints.5 Several writers, heavily in-
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1. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
2. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967).
3. Id. at 381.
4. 433 U.S. at 49-50 n.15.
5. See, e.g., Altschuler, Sylvania, vertical restraints and dual distribution, 25 ANTITRUST
BULL. 1 (1980); Bohling, A Simplified Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints: Integrating
Social Goals, Economic Analysis and Sylvania, 64 IOWA L. REV. 461 (1979); Bork, Vertical
Restraints: Schwinn Overruled, 1977 SuP. CT. REV. 171; Handler, Changing Trends in Anti-
trust Doctrines: An Unprecedented Supreme Court Term-1977, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 979
(1977); Louis, Vertical Distribution Restraints after Sylvania: A Postscript and Comment, 76
MicH. L. REV. 265 (1977); Pitofsky, The Sylvania Case: Antitrust Law Analysis of Von-Price
Vertical Restrictions, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1978); Posner, The Rule of Reason anid the
Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1977); Red-
lich, The Burger Court and the Per Se Rule, 44 ALB. L. REV. 1 (1979); Steuner, Beyoid
Sylvania. Reason Returns to Vertical Restraints, 47 ANTITRUST L.J. 1007 (1978); Note, Ad-
vent of the New Industrial State: Continental T. V v. GTE Sylvania, 14 CAL. W.L. REV. 632
(1979); Comment, A Proposed Rule of Reason, Analysis for Restrictions on Distribution, 47
FORDHAM L. REV. 527 (1979); Comment, Franchising and Vertical Customer-Territorial Re-
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fluenced by the "Chicago school,"' 6 have gone so far as to con-
done all kinds of dealer limitations initiated by the manufac-
turer, and even to propose the abolition of the per se rule for
vertical price restrictions. 7
In the European Economic Community8 (EEC or Commu-
nity), the treatment of distribution agreements under
paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 85 of the Treaty establishing the
European Economic Community (EEC Treaty or Treaty) con-
stitutes, now as ever, one of the principal themes of competi-
tion policy.9 Many of the individual decisions on cartels and
strictions: GTE, Sylvania and the Demise of the Social Goals of the Sherman Act, 9 TEx. TECH.
L. REV. 267 (1977).
6. See Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925
(1979).
7. Cf. R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 288 (1978); Posner, supra note 5, at 17;
Bork, supra note 5, at 187; Donald F. Turner, Les Restrictions Verticales dans la Distribu-
tion auv Etats-Unis, Speech delivered at an international seminar on distribution
problems, jointly organized by the French Government and the Commission, in
Strasbourg (December 5-6, 1983), reprinted in REVUE DE LA CONCURRENCE ET DE LA
CONSOMMATION, 21, 25-27, Numero Special (Supp. No. 25 1984).
8. Italy, France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands
formed the EEC by signing the Treaty establishing the European Economic Commu-
nity, Mar. 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cd. 5179-1) (official English Transla-
tion), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (unofficial English Translation) [hereinafter cited as EEC
Treaty]. Its principal goal is to promote the free movement of goods within the Com-
mon Market. Id. arts. 2-3.
9. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 85. Article 85 states:
1. The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the common
market: all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of
undertakings and concerted practices which may affect trade between Mem-
ber States and which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition within the common market and in particular
which:
(a) directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other
trading conditions;
(b) limit or control production, markets, technical development, or in-
vestment development;
(c) share markets or sources of supply;
(d) apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other
trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the
other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature or ac-
cording to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of
such contracts.
2. Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
3. The provisions of paragraph 1 may, however, be declared inapplicable
in the case of:
1984] EXCL USIVE DIS TRIB UTION A GREEMENTS
abuses of dominant positions that the Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities' ° (Commission) has taken during the last
five years deal with exclusive distributorships, selective distri-
bution, or a combination of both." Furthermore, the Com-
mission 2 has recently published Regulations 1983/83"s and
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decision or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
which contributes to improving the production or distribution of goods or
to promoting technical or economic progress, while allowing consumers a
fair share of the resulting benefit, and which does not:
(a) impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not
indispensible to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition
in respect of a substantial part of the products.
Id.
10. The Commission is established under article 155 of the EEC Treaty. Id. art.
155. The Commission is "the administrative or the executive arm" of the EEC. B.
HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST: A COMPAR-
ATIVE GUIDE 412 (1979 & Supp. 1983).
11. See Polistil/Arbois, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 136) 9 (1984), 3 COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,587; IBM personal computer, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 118)
24 (1984), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,585; Saba II, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
376) 41 (1983), 3 COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 10,568; Murat, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 348) 20 (1983), 3 COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 10,544; Ford Werke, 26, O.J.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 327) 31 (1983), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,539 (final
decision); Cafeteros de Colombia, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 360) 31 (1982), 3 COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,448; National Panasonic, 25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 354)
28 (1982), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,441; Ford Werke, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 256) 20 (1982), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,480 (interim measures);
AEG-Telefunken, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 117) 15 (1982), 3 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 10,366; Hasselblad, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 161) 18 (1982), 3 COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,401; Moet & Chandon, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 94) 7
(1982), [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,352; Sopelem-
Vickers I, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 391) 1 (1981), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,393; Hennessy-Henkell, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 383) 11 (1980), [1978-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,283; Johnson &Johnson, 23 OJ.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 377) 16 (1980), [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 10,277; Distillers Co. Ltd.-Victuallers, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 233) 43
(1980), [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,253; Krups, 23
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 120) 26 (1980), [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 10,223; Pioneer Hi-Fi Equipment, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 60) 21
(1980), [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,185; BP
Kemi/DDSF, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 286) 32 (1979), [1978-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,165; Kawasaki, 22 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L
16) 9 (1979), [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,097.
12. The Commission has the authority to promulgate regulations. EEC Treaty,
supra note 8, art. 169.
13. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
1 2730 (corrigenda at 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 281) 24 (1983)).
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1984/83' on the application of article 85(3) of the Treaty to
categories of exclusive distribution agreements and exclusive
purchasing agreements and has also published a comprehen-
sive Notice' 5 aimed at facilitating the understanding of these
Regulations by undertakings and law courts of the member
states.'" Another block exemption regulation '7 concerning the
distribution of automobiles and their spare parts is likely to be
adopted in the near future.' 8 The Court ofJustice of the Euro-
pean Communities' 9 (Court) for its part, has handed down ap-
proximately thirty rulings on various legal aspects of the distri-
bution problem.2 0 Nevertheless, the issue is far from being de-
14. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 5 (1983), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
2733 (corrigenda at 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 281) 24-25 (1983)).
15. The Commission from time to time may issue Notices giving guidance as to
its view of the law in the Community. C.S. KERSE, EEC ANTITRUST PROCEDURE 3
(1981).
16. Commission Notice Concerning Commission Regulations (EEC) No.
1983/83 and No. (EEC) 1984/83 of 22 June 1983 on the Application of Article 85(3)
of the Treaty to categories of exclusive distribution agreements and exclusive
purchasing agreements, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 355) 7 (1983), 3 COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 10,548, amended by 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 101) 2 (1984), 3 Com-
MON MET. REP. (CCH) 10,583 [hereinafter cited as 1983 Notice].
17. A block exemption automatically exempts the otherwise unlawful practices
listed in the regulation from the prohibition of article 85 of the EEC Treaty. See D.
LASOK &J.W. BRIDGE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES, 392-93 (3rd ed. 1982).
18. See Draft Commission Regulation on the application of Article 85(3) of the
Treaty to certain categories of motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements,
26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 165) 2 (1983), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,493. For
a critical comment, see Davidow, EEC Proposed Competition Rules for Motor Vehicle Distri-
bution: An American Perspective, 28 ANTITRUST BULL. 863 (1983).
19. The judicial power of the EEC resides in the Court ofJustice. Its main func-
tion is to ensure that the law is obeyed in interpretation and application of the
Treaty. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 164.
20. Hydrotherm v. Compact, 1984 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.- , 3 COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) - ; Hasselblad v. Comm'n, 1984 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. - , 3 COM-
MON MK'. REP. (CCH) 14,014; Ford Werke v. Comm'n, 1984 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.
- , 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,025 (interim measures); Ciment et Betons v.
Kerpen & Kerpen, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.- , 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
14,043; AEG-Telefunken v. Comm'n, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 3151, 3 COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,018; Demo Studio Schmidt v. Comm'n, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. 3045, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,009; Musique Diffusion Frangaise v.
Comm'n S.A., 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1825, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8880; Coditel S.A. v. Cin6-Vog Films S.A., 1982 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 3381, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder. COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8865;
Salonia v. Poidomani, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1563, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8758; L'Oreal N.V. v. De Nieuwe A.M.C.K., 1980 E.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 3775, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
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finitively settled.
Against this background, a comparison between United
States and EEC law is of obvious interest. To what extent are
United States and the EEC competition policy approaches to
exclusive distribution agreements guided by the same or simi-
lar ideas? Can parallel trends be identified in the recent devel-
opments which have occurred in this field? This Article tries to
analyze and answer both questions.
I. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS
Any comparison between the United States and the EEC
competition law systems should take into account the existence
8715; S.A. Lanc6me v. Etos B.V., 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2511, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8714; Anne Marty S.A. v. Est~e
Lauder S.A., 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2481, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8713; Procureur de la Rbpublique v. Giry and Guerlain, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2327, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8712; Distillers Co. Ltd. v. Comm'n, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2229, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8613; BMW Belgium S.A. v. Comm'n,
1979 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2435, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8548; Tepea B.V. v. Comm'n, 1978 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1391, [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8467; Miller Int'l Schallplatten GmbH
v. Comm'n, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 131, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8439; De Bloos v. Bouyer, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2359,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8444; Metro SB-Gross-
mirkte GmbH v. Comm'n, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, [1977-1978 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435; De Norre v. N.V. Brouwerij Concordia,
1977 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 65, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $
8386; S.A. Fonderies Roubaix v. Fonderies Roux, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 111,
[1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8341; Suiker Unie v. Comm'n,
1975 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1663, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
$ 8334; Van Vliet Kwasten-en Ladderfabriek N.V. v. Fratelli Dalle Crode, 1975 E.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1103, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8314;
S.A. Brasserie de Haecht v. Consorts Wilkin-Janssen II, 1973 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
77, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8170; Begu~lin Im-
port Co. v. G.L. Import Export S.A., 1971 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 949, [1971-1973
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8149; S.A. Cadillon v. Firma H6ss,
1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 351, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) $ 8135; Brauerei A. Bilger S6hne GmbH v. Jehle, 1970 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.
127, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) T 8076; V61k v.
Vervaecke, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 295, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8074; S.A. Brasserie de Haecht v. Wilkin I, 1967 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. 407, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8053; Italy v.
Council and Comm'n, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 389, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8048; Consten and Grundig v. Comm'n, 1966 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) $
8046; Soci~t6 Technique Minibre v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. 235, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8047.
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of certain fundamental differences between the relevant sub-
stantive rules and the methods of applying them. Both systems
share the general aim of guaranteeing workable competition,
which is considered to be the best means to promote efficiency
in industry and trade, to stimulate economic and technical pro-
gress, and to preserve free enterprise. However, the two sys-
tems differ considerably as to the means of achieving these
goals.
In the United States, section 1 of the Sherman Act prohib-
its restrictive agreements if they are in restraint of trade or
commerce.2" But whether they really violate the law depends
on the nature of the restriction.2 Only clearly anticompetitive
conduct-in other words, conduct that "almost always results
in adverse competitive effects, and almost never is justified by
business reasons sufficiently persuasive to counteract those ad-
verse effects" 23 _is per se illegal. All other situations are gov-
erned by the rule of reason, under which, according to the
Supreme Court's definition in Sylvania, "the factfinder weighs
all the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a restrictive
practice should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable re-
straint on competition.- 24 United States antitrust law thus
provides for one decision making process where the totality of
anticompetitive and procompetitive effects of the restraint are
taken into consideration.
In the EEC, restrictive agreements undergo a two-step
scrutiny. The first question is always: do they have as their ob-
ject or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of compe-
tition within the Common Market, thereby actually or poten-
tially affecting trade between member states?25 If the answer is
in the affirmative, the agreement is prohibited under article
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
22. Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 49.
23. Pitofsky, supra note 5, at 12.
24. 433 U.S. at 49.
25. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 85(1). This question has become highly
controversial. See V. KORAH, EXCLUSIVE DEALING AGREEMENTS IN THE EEC, REGULA-
TION 67/67 REPLACED 59 (1984). Compare van der Esch, Industrial Property Rights Under
EEC Law, in 1983 FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLI-
CIES OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY 539 (B. Hawk ed. 1984) with
Schechter, The Rule of Reason in European Competition Law, in 2 LEGAL ISSUES OF EURO-
PEAN INTEGRATION 1 (1982).
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85(1) and is automatically void under article 85(2).26 Both
legal consequences can be avoided by declaring the prohibi-
tion inapplicable according to article 85(3).27 The second
question therefore is: does the agreement also fulfill the four
conditions of exemption laid down in the latter provision?28 A
legal presumption that the standards of article 85(3) are met
exists in cases where the agreement is covered by a block ex-
emption regulation. Outside the scope of such a regulation,
exemptions from the general ban on cartels can only be
granted on a case-by-case basis, by means of an individual
Commission decision.
In a legal system of this kind there is logically no room for
either a per se rule or for a rule of reason limiting the scope of
the prohibition that the law imposes on cartels. Any agreement
caught by article 85(1) has at least a chance of being exempted
under article 85(3), albeit under specific circumstances.2 9 Only
the exemption decision implicates considerations that under
United States law characterize the rule of reason; namely an
answer to the question of whether the advantages obtained
from the agreement are sufficient to compensate for the conse-
quent reduction in competition. This does not mean that eco-
nomic analysis is without importance for the finding of an in-
fringement of article 85(1). The Court and the Commission
have on several occasions admitted that contractual clauses
which cut back the economic freedom of the interested parties
or of third parties are not restrictive where they offer the only
way to create new competition that would otherwise not de-
velop.3 ° However, an agreement that restricts actual or poten-
26. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, arts. 85(1)-(2).
27. Id. art. 85(3).
28. Id.; see Consten and Grundig v. Comm'n, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299,
348, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046, at 7673.
29. See Soci~t6 Technique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 235, 248, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8047, at 7695.
30. See Nungesser v. Comm'n, 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, 2069, [1981-
1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8805, at 7562; S.A. Cadillon v.
H6ss, 1971 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 351, 356, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MET. REP. (CCH) 8135, at 7542; V61k v. Vervaecke, 1969 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 295,
302, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8074, at 8086; So-
ci(t6 Technique Minibre v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
235, 249, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8047, at 7696;
SAFCO, 15 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 13) 44 (1972), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder]
1984]
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tial competition, and therefore violates article 85(1), would
never lose its illegal character by the mere fact that it also con-
tains some substantial procompetitive elements." Advantages
and disadvantages of the restraint have to be weighed under
article 85(3) in order to determine whether the agreement
qualifies for exemption.
While the rule of reason in United States antitrust law and
the individual exemption procedure in EEC competition law
correspond insofar as both call for a balancing of economic
benefits and harms, they differ as to the way in which to strike
it. In the United States it is still an open question whether, and
to what extent, factors such as the purpose of the restraint, the
degree of foreclosure of intraband competition, the existence
of effective interbrand competition, product differentiation,
barriers to entry, the manufacturers' market power or the dis-
tributors' access to alternative sources of supply, or even cer-
tain social and political values (e.g., the preservation of in-
dependent businesses or the satisfaction of consumer inter-
ests) ought to be taken into account for the evaluation of
vertical restraints. 2 The solution to this problem is left to the
courts; thereby vesting them with large discretionary powers.
In the EEC, the main exemption criteria have been laid down
in the Treaty itself.13 Article 85(3) provides that a restrictive
agreement can only be exempted from the prohibition rule if it
involves substantial advantages not merely for the parties but
also for third persons, particularly consumers, and for the
economy of the Community in general. 4
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9487; Alliance de constructeurs fran~ais de machines-
outils, 11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 201) 1 (1968), [1965-1969 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9249.
31. See Consten and Grundig v. Comm'n, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 299, 342-
43, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046, at 7662-63.
32. For an overview, see Altschuler, supra note 5, at 23-32.
33. See Consten and Grundig v. Comm'n, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 299, 348,
[1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046, at 7668.
34. See Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH v. Comm'n, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
1875, 1916, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8435, at
7856. The same provision excludes the exemption of restrictive clauses which are not
necessary to attain the above-mentioned positive objectives and of the agreement as
a whole if it would give the parties the possibility of eliminating competition in re-
spect of a substantial part of the products in question. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8,
art. 85(3). It follows from the wording of the law that the Commission has to examine
in each case whether the proposed business purposes-provided that they are legiti-
mate-can be achieved by less restrictive means. The Commission also has to ascer-
[Vol. 8:1
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Where the wording of article 85(3) leaves room for discre-
tion, the exemption decision will be guided by considerations
based on the general aims and principles of the EEC Treaty.
One of the main goals of the EEC is to bring about and to
maintain a real common market, forming one economically in-
tegrated territorial entity.3 5 This helps to explain two priori-
ties within the EEC's competition policy.3 16 Since the 1960's
the institutions of the EEC have, on the one hand, made a
great effort to convince the market participants to change
traditional patterns of production and trade in order to take
advantage of the opportunities and the rights which a large
common market offers to them. Block exemption regulations,
individual exemption decisions, and other kinds of indirect in-
tervention constitute means to that end. On the other hand,
the Commission and the Court have always vigorously con-
demned agreements and business practices that tend to insu-
late national markets within the Community and, hence, solid-
ify the old dividing lines along state boundaries.
The overriding political aim of the Treaty is to integrate
the markets and the economies of the member states; this ex-
plains why the Commission approaches vertical restrictions,
particularly those in distribution agreements, differently from
the United States antitrust enforcement agencies and law
courts. For instance, territorial protection for the dealer is re-
garded with suspicion under the EEC competition rules be-
cause it entails a partitioning of the Common Market. Absolute
territorial protection is almost "illegal per se. '
tain that notwithstanding the intended restrictions, competition on the relevant mar-
ket remains effective. This implies a careful analysis of the effects of the agreements
on interbrand as well as on intrabrand competition. Metro SB-Grossmiirkte GmbH v.
Comm'n, 1977 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1906, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435, at 7851.
35. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 2.
36. For a comprehensive overview, see Commission, Reports on Competition
Policy (published annually in conjunction with the General Reports on the Activities
of the European Communities).
37. Under article 85(3), sound business reasons, even if accompanied by sub-
stantial advantages for the economy as a whole, would almost never be sufficient to
counterbalance the disadvantages for economic integration resulting from the sepa-
ration of a national market. See Consten and Grundig v. Comm'n, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 299, 347-50, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046,
at 7681-84. Economic analysis under the rule of reason does not seem to pay much
attention to this element which is so important for the Community.
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Finally, United States antitrust law tends to disregard the
differences between the various types of distribution agree-
ments and to focus only on the kind of restrictions which they
involve (horizontal and vertical, price and nonprice restraints).
The EEC attitude differs sharply. Exclusive distribution and se-
lective distribution are each subject to a specific type of evalua-
tion under the competition rules because they influence mar-
ket conditions and trade between member states in quite dif-
ferent manners. For this reason, this Article focuses on
exclusive distribution alone.
II. EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTORSHIPS
A. The Concept
Exclusive distribution agreements are contracts between
two undertakings whereby one party (the supplier, in most
cases a manufacturer) agrees with the other (the reseller, in
most cases a dealer) to supply only to that other party certain
goods for resale within a defined area. This concept, which is
generally used in EEC law texts, reflects economic realities.
The analysis of approximately 40,000 agreements brought to
the Commission's attention between 1962 and 1967 has shown
that 30,000 of them corresponded with the above-mentioned
definition. The restriction of a sales territory to the dealer,
together with the promise by the manufacturer not to appoint
any other dealer within that territory, must therefore be con-
sidered as the essential elements of every exclusive distribu-
tion agreement. Usually the manufacturer explicitly or implic-
itly also agrees not to sell directly within the area allotted to his
dealer.
Although the obligations imposed on the supplier consti-
tute the core of exclusive distributorship, it is obvious that nor-
mally they do not stand alone. In most cases the reseller will
undertake certain obligations vis-A-vis the supplier. 8
38. For example, the reseller may commit himself to purchase the contract
goods only from the other party and not from third suppliers or dealers (exclusive
purchasing clause); to purchase complete ranges of goods or minimum quantities;
not to manufacture or to distribute competing goods (non-competition clause); not
to sell to or not to seek customers outside the area defined in the contract (territorial
restrictions); to sell only to certain categories of buyers (customer restrictions); to
respect resale prices that are fixed or recommended by the supplier (price restric-
tions); or to assure an efficient distribution by advertising, by building up and main-
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B. Application of Article 85(1)
1. General Remarks
The first question which interested parties usually submit
to the competent authorities in the EEC is whether their agree-
ments containing exclusive distributorship clauses come under
article 85(1), and therefore need exemption under article 85(3)
to be legal. Unfortunately, in many cases the answer is unclear.
As the Court already pointed out in 1966 in Sociit6 Technique
Miniere v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH 3 9 the application of the pro-
hibition of article 85(1) depends less on the legal form of the
agreement than on its actual or potential effects on competi-
tion and trade between member states.4" The elements of arti-
cle 85(1) require economic evaluation. An exclusive distribu-
tion agreement therefore does not automatically fall under the
ban on cartels, but it can do so by reason of a particular factual
situation or the severity of the clauses protecting the exclusive
dealership.
The first element of article 85(1) requires a finding that
such an agreement "has as its object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition within the common
market."'4 This finding depends in particular on the following
factors:
1. the nature and quantity, limited or otherwise, of the
products covered by the agreement;
2. the position and importance of the parties on the rele-
vant product market;
3. the isolated nature of the agreement in question or, al-
ternatively, its position in a series of agreements;
4. the severity of the clauses intended to protect the exclu-
sive dealership or, alternatively, the opportunities allowed
for other commercial competitors in the same products by
taining a network of qualified retailers, by stocking sufficient quantities of the con-
tract goods or by providing pre-sales or after-sales services (sales promotion clauses).
The United States Supreme Court considers territorial and customer restrictions as
functionally and theoretically the same. See Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 46; cf. Soci& Tech-
nique Mini~re v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 235, 248,
[1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8047, at 7695.
39. 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 235, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8047.
40. Id. at 249-50, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8047, at 7696.
41. See EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 85(1).
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way of parallel reexportation and importation.4 2
The second element of article 85(1) requires a finding that
the agreement is likely to effect trade between member
states.43 An agreement effects trade between member states if
it has the potential to partition the market between member
states, an outcome contrary to the goals of the EEC.4 4
The Court has suggested a case-by-case approach in pro-
nouncing these principles. 45 On the one hand, the Court's
guidelines for the application of article 85(1) to exclusive dis-
tribution agreements refer to variable quantitative factors such
as the number and kind of products concerned and the market
position of the parties. This has generally been understood to
be the declaration of a de minimus rule under which certain
agreements of minor importance may escape from the ban on
cartels, despite the restrictive nature of the clauses they con-
tain. The Court, however, has also pointed out that qualitative
factors such as the contractual obligations play a dominant role
in all other cases. This qualitative analysis allows room for a
more general view of the problem. Other rulings of the Court
as well as the Commission's enforcement policy, embodied in
individual decisions as well as in the relevant block exemption
regulations, have provided further guidance, summarized in
the following section.
42. Soci&t6 Technique Minire v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E. Comm.
Ct.J. Rep. at 250, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8047, at
7695.
43. EEC Treaty, supra note 8, art. 85(1).
44. Soci&6 Technique Miniire v. Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH, 1966 E. Comm.
Ct.J. Rep. at 250, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 18047, at
7695. The Court of Justice held that for this requirement to be fulfilled it must be
possible to foresee with a sufficient degree of probability on the basis of a set of
objective factors of law and of fact that the agreement in question may have an influ-
ence, direct or indirect, actual or potential, on the patterns of trade between member
states. Id. Therefore, in order to determine whether an agreement which contains a
clause granting an exclusive right of sale comes within the field of application of
article 85, it is necessary to consider in particular whether it is capable of bringing
about a partitioning of the market in certain products between member states and
thus rendering more difficult the interpenetration of trade which the Treaty is in-
tended to create. Id.
45. See, e.g., Hummel-Isbecue, 8 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2581 (1965), 11965-1969
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9063; D.R.U.-Blondel, 8 J.O. COMM.
EUR. 2194 (1965), [1965-1969 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9049.
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2. Restrictive and Nonrestrictive Obligations
Certain clauses in exclusive distribution agreements are
always prohibited by article 85(1), provided that they may have
appreciable repercussions on competition and trade between
member states. This follows from the cases decided by the
Commission and the Court and from the wording of Regula-
tion 1983/83,46 which expressly exempts some of these clauses
and refuses to exempt others.
a. Territorial Restrictions
Generally, territorial restrictions imposed on the sup-
plier" or on third parties" to protect the exclusive dealership
come under the prohibition. This includes the case of the sup-
plier's obligations not to sell within the contract territory to
other resellers 49 or to final users or consumers.5 0 The exclu-
sive supply arrangement prevents third party dealers from ob-
taining the contract goods within the exclusive distributor's
territory directly from the manufacturer. A noncompetition
clause (such as the one mentioned above) hinders direct
supply by the manufacturer to nontraders within the contract
territory and hence strengthens the protection given to the ex-
clusive distributor. Territorial restraints imposed on the latter
are likewise caught by article 85(1). It makes no difference
whether they are formulated as outright export bans5' or take
the form of an obligation not to develop an active sales policy
46. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 173) 1 (1983), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
2730.
47. See, e.g., Maison jallatte S.A.-Hans Voss KG, 9 J.O. COMM. EUR. 37 (1966),
[1965-1969 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 9083.
48. See, e.g., Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 837,
853, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8276, at 7129-30.
49. See Comm'n Regulation No. 1983/83, art. 1, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173)
1 (1983), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2730.
50. See id. art. 2(l).
51. See, e.g., Pioneer Hi-Fi Equipment, 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 60) 21 (1980),
[1978-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKr. REP. (CCH) 10,185, aff'd, Musique Dif-
fusion Franqaise v. Comm'n, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1825, [1981-1983 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8880; Miller Int'l Schallplatten GmbH, 19 Oj.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 357) 40 (1976), [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 9901, aff-d, Miller Int'l Schallplatten v. Comm'n, 1978 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.
131, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8439.
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outside the contract territory.
52
b. Exclusive Purchasing, Noncompetition and Customer
Restrictions
Both exclusive purchasing clauses, which forbid the exclu-
sive distributor from buying the contract goods from other
traders,53 and noncompetition clauses, which prevent him
from dealing in competing goods made by other manufactur-
ers,54 constitute restrictions within the meaning of article
85(1). The same is true for customer restrictions imposed on
the exclusive distributor. The EEC competition rules start
from the principle that dealers must also have the freedom to
choose those to whom they sell. 55 The Court has recognized,
however, that an obligation to ascertain that the contract
goods are distributed and retailed only by qualified dealers is
compatible with article 85(1).56 The Commission also applies
this rule, which has been developed with respect to selective
distribution networks, to exclusive distribution agreements.57
c. Price Restrictions
Price restrictions constitute, after market partitioning ar-
rangements, the most serious violations of article 85(1). Resale
price maintenance is therefore considered unlawful regardless
of whether the manufacturer uses the dealer to observe mini-
mum, maximum, or fixed prices. 5s Where resale prices are im-
posed only on goods that the exclusive distributor supplies to
customers outside his contract territory, the obligation in ques-
52. See Comm'n Regulation No. 1983/83, art. 2(2)(c), 26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No.
L 173) 1 (1983), 1 COMMON MYT. REP. (CCH) 2730.
53. See id. art. 2(2)(b).
54. See id. art. 2(2)(a).
55. See id. recital 8.
56. See Salonia v. Poidomani, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1563, [1979-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8758; L'Or~al v. De Nieuwe A.M.C.K.,
1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3775, 3790-91, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8715, at 8607; Lanc6me v. Etos, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2511,
2536, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8714, at 8581;
Metro Grossmirkte GmbH v. Comm'n, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, 1904,
[1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435, at 7850.
57. See 1983 Notice, supra note 16, para. 20.
58. See AEG-Telefunken, 25 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 117) 15 (1982), 3 COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,366; GERO-fabriek, 20 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 16) 8 (1977),
[1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. 9914.
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tion amounts generally to a territorial restriction. 59 The terri-
torial character also prevails in arrangements on equalization
payments between the parties or between several exclusive dis-
tributors to be effected in the case of sales within the other's
area. 60 Finally, article 85(1) applies to contractual obligations
restraining the manufacturer's freedom to pursue an autono-
mous pricing policy. For this reason, a "most favored dealer"
clause has to be considered a restriction of competition. 6'
d. Miscellaneous Clauses
Other clauses often imposed on the exclusive distributor
are considered not to restrict competition, aside from excep-
tional circumstances. These include obligations to purchase
complete lines or minimum quantities of contract goods or to
maintain adequate stocks. Article 85(1) catches these obliga-
tions only when they actually amount to exclusive purchasing
from the manufacturer or to exclusive dealing in the manufac-
turer's goods.
3. Exceptions to the Prohibition Rule
Article 85(1) applies only to agreements that are capable
of restricting competition and trade between member states to
an appreciable extent.6" The Commission and the Court have
59. SeeJunghans, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 30 ) 10 (1977), [1976-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. 9912; SABA, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 28) 19
(1976), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9802, afd sub nor.
Metro SB-Grossmairkte GmbH v. Comm'n, 1977 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1875, [1977-
1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435; Omega, 13 J.O. COMM.
EUR. (No. L 242) 22 (1970), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
9396; Kodak,J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 147) 24 (1970), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9378.
60. See Campari, 21 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69 (1978), [1978-1981 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,035; Transocean Marine Paint Association,
20 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 103) 10 (1967), [1965-1969 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 9188.
61. In a recent decision the Commission has even condemned an undertaking
by the manufacturer to supply the exclusive distributor at "competitive prices."
Polistil/Arbois, 37 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 136) 9 (1984), 3 COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 10,587. This commitment prevented the manufacturer from setting his
prices according to the quantities supplied and according to conditions on the rele-
vant market. This pricing policy also allowed the exclusive distributor to combat pos-
sible competition from parallel trade. Id. at 12, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,587, at 11,393.
62. See supra note 30.
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defined several situations where these conditions are not satis-
fied, either because the agreement does not affect competition
within the Common Market or inter-EEC trade at all, or be-
cause the actual or potential influence of the agreement on
both is so weak that it can be neglected according to the de
minimis rule.63
a. Exclusive Agency Agreements
Since 1962, Community law has recognized that exclusive
agency agreements fall outside article 85(1).64 The manufac-
turer's obligation not to appoint other agents in the area allot-
ted to the other party, as well as the obligations imposed on
the exclusive agent to confine his business activities to the con-
tract territory, to sell the manufacturer's goods exclusively and
only at prices and conditions fixed by the manufacturer, do not
constitute restrictions of competition. The Commission and
the Court have expressed the same opinion, but for different
underlying reasons. In its 1962 Notice on exclusive dealing
contracts with commercial agents, the Commission takes the
view that these contracts do not
prevent, restrict or distort competition within the Common
Market. In the market for goods, a commercial agent plays
only an auxilliary part. In this market, he works according to
the instructions and in the interest of the enterprise for
which he is acting. Unlike an independent merchant, he is
himself neither buyer nor seller, but seeks out buyers or
sellers for the benefit of the other party to his contract who
actually buys or sells.65
The restrictive effects that an exclusive agency contract may
produce on the market of services offered by commercial
agents are considered by the Commission "a consequence of
the particular mutual obligation for the commercial agent and
for his employer to protect each other's interests. That is why
it does not consider this to be a restriction of competition. 66
63. See infra notes 64-99 and accompanying text.
64. See Comm'n Notice on exclusive dealing contracts with commercial agents, 5
J.O. COMM. EUR. 2921 (1962), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2697 [hereinafter cited
as 1962 Notice].
65. Id. at 2922, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2697, at 1842 (unofficial
translation).
66. Id. at 2923, 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2697, at 1842.
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According to the Court, the inapplicability of article 85(1)
follows from the fact that a manufacturer who sells through
agents has integrated the distribution of his goods into his own
undertaking.6 7 The internal organization of a single enterprise
cannot be challenged by enforcing a rule which prohibits collu-
sion between several undertakings.6 8
The different approaches taken by the Commission and
the Court can, under certain circumstances, lead to different
results. If an important commercial undertaking has concluded
agency contracts with three small competing manufacturers,
would it, as agent, be economically integrated into the internal
organization of all three "principals"? Can a small, or me-
dium-sized, undertaking incorporate an important trading
group simply by means of an agency contract? The Commis-
sion's concept of "special relationships" between principal and
agent seems to permit an affirmative answer to both questions.
Under the Court's theory of economic integration, this appears
more difficult.
Considerations of economic analysis should outweigh for-
malistic legal arguments. This would be consistent with the at-
titude of the Commission and the Court towards other at-
tempts to circumvent article 85(1). In its 1962 Notice, the
Commission pointed out that its assessment of exclusive
agency agreements is not governed by the name used to de-
scribe the representative but by objective economic criteria.69
Where the agent engages in activities proper to an independ-
ent trader by carrying on transactions on his own account, by
agreeing to undertake financial risks bound up with the sale of
the contract goods, by maintaining at his own expense a con-
siderable stock or a substantial after-sales service, or by setting
prices or other terms of business, he ceases to be an auxiliary.
In Pittsburgh Corning Europe-Formica Belgium-Hertel,7" the Com-
mission refused to consider an independent manufacturer as a
67. See Italy v. Council & Comm'n, 1966 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 389, 407-08,
[1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8048, at 7726; Consten
and Grundig v. Comm'n, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 299, 339-40, [1961-1966 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046, at 7655.
68. Consten, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 339-40, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046, at 7655.
69. 1962 Notice, supra note 64, at II.
70. 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 272) 35 (1972), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9539.
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commercial agent. The Court held in Suiker Unie and Others v.
Commission 7 that agreements between manufacturers and trad-
ers, under which the same commercial undertaking operated
both as an agent and as an independent wholesaler in relation
to the same commodity, could not escape article 85(1).
b. Exclusive Distribution Agreements Between Firms of the
Same Group
An exception to the prohibition on cartels is also granted
to exclusive distribution agreements concluded between firms
belonging to the same group.72 It is unclear, however,
whether this rule applies in all cases. The Court in Centrafarm v.
Sterling Drug7" expressed the view that article 85(1) does not
apply to agreements
between undertakings belonging to the same concern and
having the status of parent company and subsidiary, if the
undertakings form an economic unit within which the sub-
sidiary has no real freedom to determine its course of action
on the market, and if the agreements or practices are con-
cerned merely with the internal allocation of tasks as be-
tween the undertakings. 4
This pronouncement leaves room for the application of
article 85(1) in two situations. First, article 85(1) applies where
the subsidiary operating as an exclusive distributor in a given
territory chooses the commercial policy it wants to pursue.
When this occurs, the agreement will be treated as if it had
been made between two undertakings not connected with each
other. Second, it applies where the arrangements made in the
agreement go beyond a simple distribution of tasks within a
single economic entity. Here the question is not whether the
parties to the contract are free to determine their conduct. The
71. 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1663, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8334.
72. See B6guelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import-Export S.A., 1971 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. 949, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8149; Kodak,
13 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 147) 24 (1970), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 9378; Christiani & Nielsen, 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 165) 12
(1969), [1965-1969 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9308.
73. 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1147, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON Mr.
REP. (CCH) 8246.
74. Id. at 1167, [1974 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8246, at
9151-57.
EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS
only problem that arises is defining the scope of the words "in-
ternal allocation of tasks."
Cases where manufacturers entrust subsidiaries with ex-
clusive distribution of their goods in the different member
states are becoming increasingly frequent. Normally, these
subsidiaries follow instructions given by the parent company
and lack economic autonomy. In any event, it will always be
difficult for the competition authorities to prove the contrary.
The Commission could intervene, however, where it finds that
the agreements are excessive by nature because they substan-
tially affect the interests of third parties. The obligation im-
posed on one subsidiary not to seek customers in the sales ter-
ritory of the second subsidiary can certainly be considered to
be justified by the need to rationalize all the commercial activi-
ties carried out by the group. But export bans and similar
clauses which prevent the subsidiaries from satisfying a sponta-
neous demand from outside the allotted territory go beyond
the limits of an "internal allocation of tasks." It is advisable
that such agreements be considered concerted practices for
the purposes of article 85(1).
c. Exclusive Distribution Agreements of Minor Importance
Exclusive distribution agreements of minor importance do
not fall under article 85(1).15 These agreements may provide
for absolute territorial protection of the exclusive distributor,
resale price maintenance, obligations to supply selected retail-
ers only, or other severe restrictions on the commercial free-
dom of the parties.76 The de minimis rule also applies to
agreements which contain less far-reaching commitments.77
Agreements of minor importance are those that do not af-
fect the free play of trade competition between member states
to any appreciable extent. 78 The meaning of the word "appre-
75. See Comm'n Notice of 19 December 1977 concerning agreements of minor
importance which do not fall under article 85(1) of the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 313) 3 (1977), 1 COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 2700.
76. See V61k v. Vervaecke, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 295, 302, [1967-1970
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8074, at 8086.
77. See S.A. Cadillon v. H6ss, 1971 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 351, 356, [1971-1973
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8135, at 7543.
78. See Bguelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import-Export S.A., i971 E. Comm. Ct.J.
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ciable" constitutes the main uncertainty in the legal assessment
of the relevant cases. The Commission and the Court have
taken different views on the question.79
According to the Court, the requirements of article 85(1)
must be considered in the actual context in which the agree-
ment exists. An agreement therefore falls outside the prohibi-
tion where it has only an insignificant effect on the market, tak-
ing into account the weak position that the undertakings con-
cerned have on the market of the product in question.8 ° The
critical point is not reached as long as the market shares held
by the parties remain under one percent, provided that they do
not belong to large groups of undertakings that, because of
their economic and financial power, are capable of enhancing
their market position in a relatively short time.8
The Commission has taken a more generous attitude. The
1970 Notice on agreements of minor importance 82 states the
view that agreements escape from the ban on cartels when the
market share of the participants amounts to not more than five
percent and when their total annual turnover does not exceed
50 million ECU.83 By applying this rule, the Commission
cleared approximately 4,000 cases of exclusive distribution
agreements that had been notified before 1967.84
Undertakings and their legal counsel should keep in mind,
however, that the Commission's 1970 Notice does not bind the
Court, any national law courts, or even the Commission itself,
and thefore the parties to an agreement have no absolute legal
Rep. 949, 960, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8149, at
7704.
79. See infra notes 81-86 and accompanying text.
80. See V61k v. Vervaecke, 1969 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 295, 302, [1967-1970
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8074, at 8086.
8 1. In all of the few cases where the Court has admitted the de minimis exception,
the interested parties were small undertakings with a modest annual turnover and
market share far below one percent. See B&guelin Import Co. v. G.L. Import-Export
S.A., 1971 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 949, [1971-1973 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8149; V61k v. Vervaecke, 1969 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 295, [1967-1970
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8074.
82. Comm'n Notice of 19 December 1977 concerning agreements of minor im-
portance which do not fall under article 85(1) of the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 313) 3 (1977), 1 COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 2700.
83. Id. at 3, 1 COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 2700, at 1854.
84. See COMMISSION, NINTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 16 n.2 (1980).
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certainty. Furthermore, the 1970 Notice does not apply
where the agreement is part of a larger network of similar
agreements made by the same manufacturer or where several
networks built up by different manufacturers cover the rele-
vant market. The Court's ruling in Sociit6 Technique Minire v.
Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH 6 makes clear that market structure
considerations, in particular the cumulative effect of the total-
ity of similar agreements, can bring an otherwise inoffensive
contract under the prohibition imposed by article 85(1).
Therefore, the parties should not rely on the de minimis rule
in borderline cases but should make sure that the agreement is
compatible with the competition rules.
d. Use of Exclusive Distributorships to Penetrate Markets
The case law of the EEC gives no clear answer to the ques-
tion whether, besides from the de minimis rule, the argument
of market penetration can be used to bring an agreement out
of the scope of article 85(1). The Court of Justice referred to
this argument in Socigt6 Technique Minire v. Maschinenbau Ulm
GmbH 87 and, indirectly, in V67k v. Vervaecke. 88 In both cases the
concept of market penetration was intertwined with de minimis
rule considerations. The same is true of two earlier decisions.
In Alliance de Constructeurs Frangais de Machines-Outils, the Com-
mission granted negative clearance to horizontal agreements
between small manufacturers relating to specialization. 9 In
Saba, the Commission granted negative clearance to joint sell-
ing.90 In Nungesser v. Commission, ' however, the Court for the
85. See C.S. KERSE, supra note 15 at 3 (notices do not have legal force in relation
to particular cases).
86. 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 235, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8047; see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
87. 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 235, 249, [1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8047, at 7696.
88. 1969 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 295, 302, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8074, at 8086.
89. See I J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 201) 1 (1968), [1965-1969 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9249.
90. See 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 28) 19 (1976), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9802, afd sub norn. Metro SB-Grossmarkte GmbH v.
Comm'n, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MET. REP. (CCH) 8435.
91. 1982 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2015, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8805.
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first time based an important decision on the concept of mar-
ket penetration without quantifying the size or the market posi-
tion of the undertakings involved.92 In general, then, article
85(1) cannot apply in the absence of actual or potential compe-
tition capable of being restricted by the agreement. It could
help the Commission to take a more flexible attitude in appro-
priate cases, even those involving big business, without seeking
refuge in some type of "rule of reason" unsuitable for achiev-
ing the purposes of article 85(1). 3
e. Exclusive Distributorships and Effect on Interstate Trade
The prohibition is inapplicable in the case of agreements
that will have no appreciable effect on trade between member
states under any circumstances. This is of particular impor-
tance for two categories of exclusive distribution agreements:
those made between undertakings established in the same
member state concerning sales within the territory of that
member state (so-called "national" agreements), and those
concluded for territories outside the EEC.
i. National Agreements
National agreements are normally not caught by article
85(1) for the reasons mentioned above, unless they contain
clauses which make reexportation to or parallel importation
from other member states more difficult, 94 or create barriers to
market entry for competing goods. A noncompetition clause
imposed on the exclusive dealer can have this affect in excep-
tional circumstances particularly when the dealer is a leading
undertaking on his home market.95 A national agreement can
also appreciably affect intra-EEC trade if it implements a cross-
border agreement96 or if it simply forms one part of a network
of similar agreements covering the whole Common Market.
92. Id. at 2069, [1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8805,
at 7544.
93. See van der Esch, Industrial Property Rights Under EEC Law in 1983 FORDHAM
CORPORATE LAW INSTITUTE, ANTITRUST AND TRADE POLICIES OF THE EUROPEAN Eco-
NOMIC COMMUNITY 539, 546 (B. Hawk ed. 1984).
94. See Goodyear Italiana-Euram, 18 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 38) 10 (1975),
[1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9708.
95. See id.
96. See Fonderies Roubaix v. Fonderies Roux, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 111,
[1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8341.
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ii. Agreements in Non-EEC Countries
Agreements made with respect to third countries do not
fall under article 85(1), except where they have noticeable
repercussions within the Common Market. 97 Whether or not
clauses which prevent the exclusive distributor or his custom-
ers from selling the contract goods inside the Community cre-
ate such effects is a question to be answered case-by-case. 8
The same approach governs the legal assessment of export
bans, or restrictions imposed on either the manufacturer or on
dealers within the Common Market, with respect to markets
outside the EEC. 99
4. Conclusions
The foregoing explanations have shown that the applica-
tion of the different exceptions which have been developed to
limit the scope of article 85(1) entails considerable legal uncer-
tainty. For this reason it seems preferable for undertakings not
to seek to escape the prohibition rule but to assure that their
exclusive distribution agreements satisfy the conditions for ex-
emption under article 85(3). The requirements of block ex-
emption and individual exemption are set out in the following
section.
C. Application of Article 85(3)
1. General Remarks
The question, under which circumstances and to what ex-
97. See Rieckermann/Aeg-Elotherm, 11 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 276) 25 (1968),
[1965-1969 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9267; Grosfillex-Fillistorf,
7J.O. COMM. EUR. 915 (1964), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2412.37.
98. See the three parallel judgments, EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS United Kingdom
Ltd., 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 811, 850, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8350, at 7364; EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS Grammofon A/S, 1976 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 871, 908, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8351, at 7402; EMI Records Ltd. v. CBS Schallplatten GmbH, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. 913, 951, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8352, at 7429.
99. See Distillers Co., 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 50) 16 (1978), [1976-1978
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,01 1;Junghans, 20 oJ. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 30) 10 (1977), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
9912; SABA, 19 o.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L 28) 19 (1976), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9802, aff'd sub nom. Metro SB-Grossmirkte GmbH v.
Comm'n, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435.
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tent exclusive distribution agreements ought to be admitted
under article 85(3), was in principle already answered twenty
years ago. In its decision of 1964 in the Grundig-Consten case,' 00
which was upheld by the Court of Justice,' 0 ' the Commission
chose open territorial exclusivity as a model for its future
policy. The main features of this policy were laid down in Reg-
ulation 67/67102 and recently reiterated in Regulation
1983/83.103
The block exemption for exclusive distribution agree-
ments is based on considerations of both economic efficiency
and market integration. The Commission takes the view that
contracts of this type merit favorable treatment primarily for
two reasons. First, they enable the manufacturer to concen-
trate his sales activities and, by dealing with only one distribu-
tor, help him to overcome distribution difficulties encountered
in international trade due to linguistic, legal, or other differ-
ences.' O4 Second, they encourage the dealer to take over sales
promotion, customer services and carrying of stocks within the
contract territory, which in the eyes of the Commission leads
to more intensive marketing and is often the most effective
way, sometimes even the only way, to launch a product in areas
beyond national boundaries. 10 5
The rationalization and the market integration effects of
exclusive distribution agreements may be reinforced where the
dealer is protected against active competition from the manu-
facturer, but is obliged to concentrate advertising and sales ef-
forts on the contract goods and on the contract territory. This
is why the prohibition in article 85 also exempts the manufac-
turer's obligation not to sell within the allotted area to final
100. 7 J.O. COMM. EUR. 2545 (1964), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2021.51.
101. Consten and Grundig v. Comm'n, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 299, [1961-
1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MK-r. REP. (CCH) 8046.
102. 10JO. COMM. EUR. 849 (1967), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2727. Reg-
ulation 67/67 came into force on May 1, 1967. Its duration was initially limited to
December 31, 1972, but was later extended to June 30, 1983 by Regulation No.
2591/72, 15 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 276) 15 (1972), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
2728.01 and Regulation No. 3577/82, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 373) 58 (1982), 1
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 2728.01.
103. 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
2730.
104. See id. recital No. 5.
105. See id. recital No. 6.
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customers or users.' °6 The dealer's obligations to purchase
the contract goods only from the manufacturer and to refrain
from manufacturing or distributing competing goods or from
seeking customers outside the contract territory have also been
exempted from the prohibition in article 85(l).1° 7
The block exemption covers only agreements between two
parties. 10 The purpose of this limitation is clearly to discour-
age horizontal collusion between manufacturers or between
dealers. Agreements whereby several manufacturers entrust
one dealer with exclusive distributorship of their products in a
given territory have effects similar to joint selling agreements.
They can lead to a substantial lessening of interbrand competi-
tion where the interested manufacturers supply the exclusive
distributor with identical or similar products.'0 9 A close case-
by-case scrutiny therefore appears to be the only acceptable
way to judge contracts of that kind. The same is true of agree-
ments which several exclusive distributors conclude collec-
tively with one manufacturer. In such cases the fear exists that
the manufacturer will be prevented from developing different
marketing strategies in order to meet the conditions prevailing
on the various geographical markets. Equal treatment of deal-
ers which is not based on sound business considerations, but
results from dealer-imposed restrictions on the manufacturer's
commercial freedom, normally does not serve the interests of
consumers either. For this reason the Commission has refused
to add a most favored dealer clause to the list of admitted re-
strictions in Regulation 1983/83.
Yet the requirement of only two participating undertak-
ings does not mean that the block exemption becomes inap-
plicable with respect to networks of exclusive distribution
agreements. It suffices that the contracts which the manufac-
turer has made in parallel with several dealers satisfy individu-
ally the conditions laid down in the Regulation.11 ° The fact
that the various obligations imposed by the manufacturer on
each of his dealers amount to horizontal restrictions which re-
106. See id. art. 2(1).
107. See id. art. 2(2).
108. See id. art. 1.
109. See SCPA-Kali und Salz, 16 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 217) 3 (1973), [1973-
1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9569.
110. See 1983 Notice, supra note 16, para. 14.
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duce intrabrand competition is without importance in this con-
text. The block exemption also applies to vertically subdivided
distribution agreements. An exclusive distributor for the whole
of the Common Market is perfectly entitled to nominate exclu-
sive subdistributors for the different member states."' These
subdistributors, for their part, may follow the same pattern in
order to organize the distribution of the contract goods down
to local markets and to retail level. Finally, the block exemp-
tion covers exclusive distribution agreements irrespective of
the market power of the parties. Clearly anticompetitive effects
that may arise from horizontally or vertically organized net-
works of agreements or from individual agreements made in a
highly concentrated market must be removed by an individual
decision of the Commission withdrawing the benefit of the
block exemption." 12 In conclusion, the manufacturer remains
largely free to adapt the model of exclusive distributorship to
the requirements of the different markets within the
Community.
The freedom of the undertakings to organize the distribu-
tion of their products in a way that best suits their respective
marketing strategies does not, however, include the right to
organize the markets on the distribution level. Exclusive distri-
bution agreements that guarantee the dealer not only the ex-
clusive right to obtain supplies directly from the manufacturer
but also that it will be the only distributor allowed to introduce
the contract goods into the allotted area are, as a matter of
principle, incompatible with article 85(3). The freedom of
users and intermediaries to purchase the manufacturer's prod-
ucts within the Common Market wherever they are offered
must not be restricted. Accordingly, both contractual clauses
in the exclusive distribution agreement, and unilateral meas-
ures taken by one or both parties in order to prevent third per-
sons from obtaining the contract goods outside the contract
territory or to sell them within that territory, have been de-
clared unlawful." 3 Even the exclusive distributor must have
the right to resell the contract goods to buyers established
111. See Duro-Dyne-Europair, 18 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 29) 11 (1975), [1973-
1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9708A.
112. See Comm'n Regulation No. 1983/83, art. 6(a)-(b), 26 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 173) 1 (1983), 3 COMMON MKTr. REP. (CCH) 2730.
113. See id. art. 3(d).
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outside the allotted areas. Agreements can onl oblige the dis-
tributor to refrain from seeking customers in other
territories.' '4
The legal protection of parallel importation and reex-
portation is not an end in itself. In the Commission's view it
constitutes a means to cut back exclusive prices imposed by an
exclusive distributor and thereby reduce important price dif-
ferences still existing between several member states. 1 5 Abso-
lute territorial protection has not been permitted even in mar-
kets that are characterized by active intrabrand competition." 16
The Commission relies heavily on intrabrand competition.
Given the long tradition of economic nationalism in Europe,
and taking into account the ability of industry to reduce the
degree of substitutability between similar goods by product
differentiation or by creating buyer preferences for a particular
brand, the Commission doubts that commercial rivalry be-
tween manufacturers alone would help to bring about a unified
114. See 1983 Notice, supra note 16, para. 28.
115. See COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY para. 46, at 55
(1972).
116. Export bans imposed on dealers in order to protect national markets have
given rise to heavy fines. See Polistil/Arbois, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 136) 9
(1984), 3 COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 10,587; National Panasonic (UK) Ltd., 25 OJ.
EUR. COMM. (No. L 354) 28 (1982), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,441; Hassel-
blad, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 161) 18 (1982), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
10,401, aff'd, Hasselblad v. Comm'n, 1984 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. -, 3 COMMON MET.
REP. (CCH) 14,014; Moet et Chandon, 25 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 94) 7 (1982),
[1978-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 10,352; Johnson &John-
son, 23 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 377) 16 (1980), [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] COm-
MON MET. REP. (CCH) 10,277; Pioneer Hi-Fi Equipment, 23 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No.
L 60) 21 (1980), [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 10,185,
aff'd, S.A. Musique Diffusion Frangaise v. Comm'n, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1825,
[1981-1983 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8880; BMW Belgium, 21
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 46) 33 (1978), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET.
REP. (CCH) 10,008, afd, BMW Belgium S.A. v. Comm'n, 1979 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 2435, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8458;
Theal/Watts, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 39) 19 (1977), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 9913, afd, Tepea BV v. Comm'n, 1978 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. 1391, [1977 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8467; Miller Int'l
Schallplatten GmbH, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 357) 40 (1976), [1976-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9901, afd, Miller Int'l Schallplatten GmbH
v. Comm'n, 1978 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 131, [1977 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8439; Deutsche Philips GmbH, 16 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 293) 40
(1973), [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9606; WEA-
Filipacchi Music S.A., 15J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 303 ) 52 (1972), [1973-1975 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 9545A. For additional Commission deci-
sions, see supra note 11.
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market and guarantee fair prices for the consumers. Its view is
shared by the Court of Justice.' 1 7
This general attitude implies a severe treatment of market
allocation agreements made between manufacturers. Regula-
tion 1983/83 can be considered a typical example of the result-
ing policy, because it denies the benefit of the block exemption
to exclusive distribution agreements that manufacturers of
competing goods conclude in respect of these goods." 8 The
danger of horizontal market division along national bounda-
ries is obvious in such cases, whether exclusive rights have
been granted either to both or only one party. It is unusual for
a manufacturer to actively help his competitor's products break
into his home market and thereby jeopardize the sales of his
own products.
The Commission has nevertheless expressed a positive
view with respect to these unilateral agreements in cases where
at least one party is a small, or medium-sized, enterprise.1 19 If
both parties are small manufacturers, the benefits of the agree-
ment will often outweigh its negative effects because the hori-
zontal cooperation normally facilitates the penetration of new
markets, whereas the protection of the home market becomes
less important. Agreements by which a small manufacturer en-
trusts an important competitor with the exclusive distribution
of its products also merit favorable consideration, for they en-
able the smaller undertaking to use an already existing large
distribution network for the sales of its products in other mem-
ber states. The opposite case, where a big manufacturer nomi-
nates a specialized small competitor as its exclusive distributor,
also does not create major problems because normally this de-
cision will be made only with respect to goods not suitable for
sale through its own distribution network. Considering that
such agreements can help to achieve the market integration
goal, the Commission has upheld the block exemption to that
extent. Reciprocal exclusive distribution agreements between
manufacturers of competing goods have been exempted only
as parts of larger horizontal deals involving, in particular, spe-
117. See Consten and Grundig v. Comm'n, 1966 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 299, 343,
[1961-1966 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8046, at 7653.
118. See Comm'n Regulation No. 1983/83, arts. 3(a)-(b), 4-5, 26 O.J. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 173) 1 (1983), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2730.
119. See id. art. 3(b).
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cialization or rationalization of the parties' production
activities. 120
2. Various Restrictions in Exclusive Distribution
Agreements
After a more general survey of exclusive distributorships,
it seems appropriate to analyze various restrictions under
article 85(3) that are commonly stipulated in the relevant
contracts.
a. Territorial Restrictions and Exclusive Supply
Obligations
The Commission and the Court of Justice have discussed
the extent to which territorial restrictions are or can be ex-
empted from the prohibition on cartels. In that respect, Regu-
lation 1983/83 provides for even higher standards than its
predecessor, Regulation 67/67. The case law follows the tradi-
tional course.
The exclusive supply obligation imposed on the manufac-
turer, which can be considered as the principal territorial re-
striction in exclusive distribution agreements, receives
favorable treatment in whatever manner it is formulated. The
parties are free to determine the size of the contract territory
to which this obligation relates. 1 ' Article 1 of Regulation
1983/83 covers a large scale of possible stipulations, ranging
120. See Sopelem-Vickers II, 24 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 391) 1 (1981), 3 COM-
MON MET. REP. (CCH) 10,393; Sopelem-Vickers 1, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70)
47 (1978), [1976-1978 Transfer Binderi COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,014; jaz-
Peter I, 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 61) 17 (1978), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,013; Rank/Sopelem, 18 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 29)
20 (1975), [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9707; FN-CF,
14 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 134) 6 (1971), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 9439; Jaz-Peter I, 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 195) 5 (1969),
[1965-1969 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 9317; Clima Chap~e-
Buderus, 12 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 195) 1 (1969), [1965-1969 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9316. For additional Commission decisions, see supra
note 11; see also Comm'n Regulation No. 3604/82, 25 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 376)
33 (1982), 1 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2743 (for the application of art. 85(3) to
specialization agreements).
121. The Commission has abandoned former plans to limit the block exemption
to agreements which are concluded for areas with not more than 100 million inhabit-
ants. See COMMISSION, SEVENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY paras. 37-38, at 54
(1978).
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from exclusive distributorship for the whole Common Mar-
ket 122 to simple location clauses protecting local sales areas. 12 1
The contract territory may also comprise member states and
nonmember countries. 1' 24  Exclusive distribution agreements
made in respect to territories outside the Community, insofar
as they come under article 85(1), must, however, be exempted
individually. No such decision has yet been made.
Only contracts that provide for one distributor in the al-
lotted area satisfy the conditions of Regulation 1983/83. 125
Where several "exclusive" dealers operate within the same ter-
ritory, an individual exemption is not required, but may be
granted. 126
According to the model of open territorial exclusivity the
parties to the agreement may only narrowly protect the exclu-
sive distributor. Under Regulation 1983/83 the manufacturer
must refrain from supplying other resellers within the contract
territory; otherwise the requirements of exclusive distribution
would no longer be fulfilled. The manufacturer may also refuse
to supply final customers or users within the contract terri-
tory.' '7  However, both obligations only have the effect of
122. Under the old Regulation No. 67/67, 10J.O. COMM. EUR. 849 (1967), the
Commission took the view that agreements of this kind did not collie under the block
exemption. See Duro-Dyne-Europair, 18 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 29) 11 (1975),
[1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 9708A. The Court of[Jus-
tice, in its recent judgment Hydrotherm v. Compact, 1984 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.-,
3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 -, has expressed the same opinion. It is questiona-
ble whether the Commission, where extending the scope of the block exemption,
remained within the limits of its powers under Council Regulation No. 19/65, 8J.O.
COMM. FUR. 533 (1965), 1 COMMON MiKt. REP. (CCH) 2718, which in article l(1)(a)
refers to "a defined area of the common market" (in French: "partie d~fin& du ter-
ritoire du marche commun;" in German: "abgegrenstes Gebiet der Gemeinsamen
Marktes").
123. For another view, see Ferry, Selective Disitibution and Other Post-Sales Restric-
tionts, 2 E. COMM. L. REV. 209 (1981).
124. See Hydrotherm v. Compact, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. - , 3 COMMON
MKr. REP. (CCH) -
125. The Commission has taken a more generous attitude in its Draft Block Ex-
emption regulation concerning motor vehicle distribution and servicing agreements,
26 O.J. EuR. COMM. (No. C 165) 2 (1983), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2730.
126. SeeJunghans, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. .30) 10 (1977), 11976-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MK-r. REP. (CCH) 1 9912. Bellamy and Child propose an appli-
cation by analogy of the block exemption. See C. BELLAMY & G.D. CHILD, COMMON
MARKET LAW OF COMPETITION § 8-46 (2d ed. 1978).
127. See Conm'n Regulation No. 1983/83, art. 2(l), 26 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L
173) I (1983), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2730.
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shielding the exclusive dealer from the active competition of
the other party. The manufacturer cannot be obliged to refrain
from supplying dealers or final users established in the con-
tract territory, where these persons wish to buy the product
concerned in other territories on terms customarily found
there. "'28 A refusal to deal in such cases constitutes a measure
preventing parallel importation in the meaning of article 3(d)
of Regulation 1983/83. The refusal would be abusive, and
therefore the block exemption would be inapplicable, if it were
not motivated by objective reasons different from considera-
tions of market isolation. 2 ' The Regulation does not permit
contractual clauses or conduct intended to protect the exclu-
sive dealer against passive competition on the part of the
manufacturer.
Moreover, although a clear separation of functions be-
tween the manufacturer and the exclusive distributor appears
to be desirable for reasons of efficiency, it should be noted that
it is up to the parties to decide whether or not they will provide
for a noncompetition clause in favor of the dealer. The manu-
facturer often reserves the right to supply within the contract
territory certain final users or categories of them, such as pub-
lic administrations, hotels, schools or nursing homes. Other
buyers who resell the contract goods only to customers outside
the allotted areas, such as ship-forwarders and duty-free shops,
have been assimilated with final users. ° They also may be
subject to a reservation clause. Both situations are legitimate
under the Regulation. The danger of collusion between the
parties does not hinder the application of the block exemption.
Possible abuses have to be treated in an individual procedure
involving withdrawal of the benefits of the Regulation.
As a matter of principle, Regulation 1983/83 condemns
any protection against parallel importation of the contract
goods by intermediaries. Examples include export bans im-
posed on wholesalers or retailers who have purchased the
product in question from the manufacturer or from his other
exclusive distributors, and refusals to sell or price discrimina-
128. See 1983 Notice, supra note 16, paras. 27-30.
129. See Hydrotherm v. Compact, 1984 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. -, 3 COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) -
130. See Distillers Co. Ltd., 23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 233) 43 (1980), [1978-
1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,253.
1984]
32 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA VJOURNAL [Vol. 8:1
tions. These practices are illegal if they are used as means to
stop transborder deliveries into the contract territory. In such
cases, one is confronted with measures prohibited under arti-
cles 3(d) of the Regulation which leads to loss of the block
exemption.
The exclusive distributor is not necessarily protected
against even active competition from other exclusive dealers
established in neighboring areas. The manufacturer may im-
pose the obligation not to seek customers outside the contract
territory on each of his exclusive distributors but he may not
be bound to do so. The Regulation forbids export bans. An
open question is whether several exclusive dealers may agree
upon compensation payments in order to indemnify each of
them for the financial loss which it suffers from parallel impor-
tation into its territory. The Commission tends to consider
such schemes as compatible with the block exemption if their
sole purpose is to refund expenditures made for presale or
aftersale services with respect to parallel imported goods.
Compensation payments do, however, come under article 3(d)
of the Regulation where they are used as an instrument to neu-
tralize price differences between member states.
In certain cases Regulation 1983/83 expects the parties
not only to refrain from impeding parallel trade, but also to
create the conditions under which such trade can emerge. This
is the case where exclusive distribution agreements are made
for goods destined to be sold directly to final consumers or
users. In the absence of independent wholesalers and retailers
who play the role of intermediaries, parallel importation into
the contract territory will normally not take place, and the exe-
cution of the agreement will in itself lead to absolute territorial
protection of the exclusive dealer. In order to avoid this unde-
sirable result, article 3(c) of the Regulation provides for a spe-
cial rule. When users can obtain the contract goods in the con-
tract territory only from the exclusive distributor and have no
alternative source of supply outside the contract territory, the
block exemption is no longer applicable. It will, however, ap-
ply again if the parties ensure that the products in question are
available from other suppliers inside or outside the allotted
area. For this purpose it would suffice that the manufacturer
himself is disposed to sell the contract goods to final users es-
tablished in the distributor's territory whenever they ask for it,
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and that these buyers can get the goods at prices and condi-
tions similar to those which the manufacturer usually applies to
customers in his home market. Here too, the emphasis is
placed on protection of intrabrand competition. Whether the
final users can purchase competing products of other manu-
facturers is not important for the purpose of the block
exemption.' 3 i
No definite answer can be given to the question of what
extent protection of the exclusive dealer against parallel im-
portation from third countries is compatible with Regulation
1983/83. Only the first of two possible situations seems to be
clear. Where intermediaries and users have no alternative
source of supply within the Common Market (for example, be-
cause the allotted area covers the whole or almost the whole
territory of the EEC), they must be assured of obtaining the
contract goods from outside the Common Market. In this case,
according to article 3(d) of the Regulation, no party may take
measures which would make parallel trade from non-member
countries into the Community more difficult. Export bans im-
posed on dealers outside the Common Market then become as
illegal as the exercise of industrial property rights for the pur-
pose of preventing the importation of contract goods into the
Community. Both types of conduct by the parties would make
them lose the benefit of the block exemption. The attempt by
the manufacturers to prevent their other customers from deliv-
ering into the Community results in the agreement falling
outside the Regulation from the date of its execution. 1 2
Where alternative sources of supply exist within the Com-
mon Market, each party can take unilateral measures in order
to prevent parallel importation into the Community without
thereby being excluded from the block exemption. The ques-
tion remains, however, whether the same rule applies when
they act on either the basis of an agreement or by concerted
action. The Commission considers illegal any clause which may
restrict competition and has not expressly been exempted
under articles 1 and 2 of the Regulation. As the block exemp-
tion is granted only on the condition that the agreement does
not contain restrictions of competition other than those listed
131. See 1983 Notice, supra note 16, para. 31.
132. Id. para. 33.
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in the aforementioned provisions, the Commission holds that
the inapplicability of Regulation 1983/83 constitutes the only
possible legal consequence in such cases.13 3 Another solution
might be found in a broader reading of article 3(d) of the Reg-
ulation. If this provision can be understood as also comprising
contractual obligations agreed upon by the parties, the block
exemption would cover the situation referred to above. The
case law seems to permit this interpretation. 134
The preceding analysis shows that exclusive distributors
benefit from a rather limited territorial protection under Regu-
lation 1983/83. The EEC legislature has not recognized the
need to protect the "official" dealers against so-called "free
riders" who sell the contract goods to consumers in the con-
tract territory without having contributed to advertising,
presale services, organization of a network of qualified dealers,
and other sales promotion activities. 135 The Regulation is
clearly based on the presumption that the parties to the agree-
ment can normally allocate marketing costs in such a way as to
prevent prices from being forced up in the exclusive distribu-
tor's area while they remain low in the manufacturer's home
market, eliminating the main incentive for parallel trade. As
this seems to be the general line followed by the Commission
and the Court of Justice, the only question still remaining is
whether particular economic circumstances may, under Com-
munity law, justify a more effective territorial protection of the
exclusive dealer. The answer, again, is negative.
In its First Report on Competition Policy of 1971 the
Commission pointed out that the temporary authorization of
an absolute territorial protection might be envisaged for exclu-
sive distribution agreements intended to enable a new pro-
ducer to break into a market. 136 However, until now no such
133. Id.
134. See Van Vliet Kwasten-en Ladderfabriek N.V. v. Fratelli Dalle Crode, 1975
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1103, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8314; Polistil/Arbois, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 136) 9 (1984), 3 COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 10,587.
135. For a short description of this problem under Community law, see V.
KORAH, supra note 25, at 7-8.
136. See COMMISSION, FIRST REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY para. 49, at 57-58
(1972).
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case has been decided. In two cases, Pittsburgh Corning Europe'137
and Distillers Company Ltd.,l18 the Commission condemned at-
tempts to overcome the problem of "free riding" by a double
price system. Dealers paid the normal price for goods resold in
the same member state, but had to pay a substantially higher
price when they purchased the same goods for exportation to
other member states. In both cases the Commission consid-
ered the manufacturer's price policy as having the same or a
similar effect as an export ban and therefore refused to exempt
the agreements.
Compensation payments between the manufacturer and
the exclusive distributor normally do not fall under article
85(1). ' If they are made between dealers, however, they are
caught by the prohibition and will only in rare cases be ex-
empted. In Transocean Marine Paint, the Commission accepted
for a limited time a system of financial compensation between
the members of a paint producers' association. 140 The in-
creased territorial protection resulting from the compensation
system was necessary to enable each of the members of the
association to build up its local market position in competition
with large undertakings. At the end of a six-year period, the
restriction was no longer considered justified.' 4'
The Commission appeared to choose a more flexible atti-
tude towards financial compensation systems when, several
months ago, it gave public notice of its intention to make a
favorable decision with regard to an agreement providing for
137. 15 J.O. CoMM. EUR. (No. L 272) 35 (1972), [1970-1972 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9539.
138. 21 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 50) 16 (1978), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,011, affd on other grounds, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
2229, [1979-1981 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8613.
139. See Campari, 21 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 70) 69, 70 (1978), [1978-1981
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,035 at 10,198.
140. Transocean Marine Paint Association I, 10 J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 163) 10
(1967), [1965-1969 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9188. The associ-
ation consisted of medium-sized undertakings, each established in a different coun-
try, set up with the intention of developing certain marine paints by using the joint
technical knowledge of the members and of manufacturing paint of the same quality
and selling it under the same trademark. Sales were organized in such a manner that
each participant had to develop its activities primarily in its own country. In this case
the Commission allowed deliveries to countries where other members were estab-
lished to be made only upon payment of a commission.
141. See Transocean Marine Paint Association II, 17 Oj. EUR. COMM. (No. L 19)
18 (1974), [1973-1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9628.
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an equalization of sales promotion costs between dealers in
different member states.'4 2 The Distillers Company Limited
(DCL) had worked out a scheme under which British wholesal-
ers who purchase Scotch whiskey of a particular brand (John-
nie Walker Red Label) in order to export it to other EEC coun-
tries would have to pay an additional charge. The total revenue
of the charge would be used to subsidize publicity campaigns
for this brand organized by DCL's exclusive distributors on the
Continent. In the manufacturer's eyes, financial compensation
of the above-mentioned kind is necessary to reintroduce John-
nie Walker Red Label on the British market (from which it had
been withdrawn by DCL after the prohibition of its double
price system). DCL argues that without a certain protection,
the exclusive dealers in other member states would be unable
to compete with parallel importers offering the whiskey at low
prices and would therefore no longer assure advertising essen-
tial for a particular brand of whiskey to survive. According to
the Commission, an exemption might be granted in such cases
for a limited period, if the charge imposed on parallel re-
straints is regressive and if it is not a disguised form of export
ban. Until now the favorable notice has not been followed by a
favorable decision.
b. Customer Restrictions
The other restrictions in exclusive distribution agree-
ments can be treated summarily. As to customer restrictions,
Regulation 1983/83 requires that the exclusive distributor re-
main free to choose his clients. 4 3 The block exemption does
not cover agreements which oblige the distributor to sell in his
contract territory only to certain categories of customers or
users.'44 It is submitted that he even has the right to supply, in
competition with the manufacturer, final consumers and users
reserved to the manufacturer. The Commission admits, how-
ever, that the exclusive distributor may be forbidden from sell-
ing the contract goods to unsuitable dealers, provided that ad-
142. See Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of Council Regulation No. 17 concern-
ing notification No. IV/30.228, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 245) 3 (1983), 3 COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,518.
143. See Comm'n Regulation No. 1983/83, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1,
recital 8 (1983), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2730.
144. See 1983 Notice, supra note 16, para. 29.
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mission to the distribution network is based on objective crite-
ria of a qualitative nature relating to the professional
qualification of the owner of the business or his staff or to the
suitability of his business premises, and provided that the crite-
ria are the same for all potential dealers and are applied in a
nondiscriminatory manner. 45 In other words, under Regula-
tion 1983/83 an exclusive distributorship can be combined
with selective distribution of the wholesalers or retailers,
where the selection is not prohibited by article 85(1). The lim-
its of the block exemption are exceeded where the selection of
the dealers involves restrictions on competition. Such cases
have to be cleared following the rules which govern the assess-
ment of selective distribution systems under article 85(3).146
c. Price Restrictions
Price restrictions in exclusive distribution agreements are
judged more severely than territorial restrictions. Where they
are included in an agreement, they lead to loss of the block
exemption. The freedom of the exclusive distributor to deter-
mine his prices and conditions of sale is one of the fundamen-
tal requirements laid down in Regulation 1983/83. The whole
concept of a single market with free trade between member
states would become unworkable if the parties could manipu-
late the resale prices of the contract goods and thereby artifi-
cially prevent parallel importation and exportation within the
Community. Thus, price restrictions imposed on dealers have
never been accepted by individual decisions. 147 Similar restric-
tions imposed on the manufacturer are likewise incompatible
with article 85(3) in general and with Regulation 1983/83 in
particular. 148 Whether systems of recommended prices qualify
145. Id.
146. See Comm'n Regulation No. 1983/83, 26 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 173) 1,
recital 8 (1983), 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 2730.
147. SeeJunghans, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 30) 10 (1977), [1976-1978 Trans-
fer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9912; GERO-fabriek, 20 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 16) 8 (1977), [1976-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9914;
SABA, 19 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 28) 19 (1976), [1976-1978 Transfer Binderi Com-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9802, afd sub norn. Metro SB-Grossmirkte GmbH v.
Comm'n, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1875, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8435; Omega, 13J.O. COMM. EUR. (No. L 242) 22 (1970), [1970-
1972 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9396.
148. See Polistil/Arbois, 27 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 136) 9 (1984), 3 COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 10,587.
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for a more favorable treatment is still an open question.
CONCLUSION
A comparison of the application of the competition laws of
the EEC and of the antitrust laws of the United States to exclu-
sive distribution agreements reveals an interesting develop-
ment in the two systems. While Continental T V., Inc. v. GTE Syl-
vania Inc. has introduced the rule of reason to the United
States approach for analyzing all nonprice vertical restrictions,
it does not provide concrete guidelines for its application. The
EEC approach, on the other hand, is designed to promote the
goal of Common Market integration by preventing the insula-
tion of national markets. Thus the Commission and the Court
of Justice have developed a favorable attitude towards territo-
rial and exclusive supply restrictions, but are stricter with re-
gard to price and customer restrictions.
